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COMMENT 
CASTLE IN THE CLOUD: 
MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR CLOUD-STORED 
DATA ON MOBILE DEVICES 
MARK WILSON* 
 
For if we are observed in all matters, we are constantly under 
threat of correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our own 
uniqueness.  We become children, fettered under watchful eyes, 
constantly fearful that—either now or in the uncertain future—patterns 
we leave behind will be brought back to implicate us, by whatever 
authority has now become focused upon our once-private and innocent 
acts.  We lose our individuality, because everything we do is observable 
and recordable.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Eighty-five years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis described “the right to 
be let alone” as “the right most valued by civilized men.”2  That right is 
now under attack, and people themselves—all of us—are the attackers.  
  * J.D. Candidate, 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A. 2005, Miami 
University (Ohio). I wish to thank my advisors for this Comment, Professors Laura Cisneros and 
Robert Calhoun of Golden Gate University School of Law, as well as everyone around me who has 
graciously endured my talking about this issue for the past few years. 
 1 Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED (May 18, 2006), www.wired.com/ 
politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886. 
 2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled 
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
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Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit announced the death of the Fourth Amendment, blaming 
technology for its demise: “Our weapon of choice?  Most recently, the 
smartphone, which, with our collective blessing, allows law enforcement 
to monitor our real-time geographic location.”3  As Judge Kozinski sees 
it, we have surrendered a disproportionate amount of privacy for a little 
convenience.4 
Though the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects,”5 its author, James Madison, could 
never have contemplated that a search of a person could simultaneously 
encompass effects located in another state.  The rise of smart phones—
cell phones with persistent Internet connections6—has injured the Fourth 
Amendment, but Judge Kozinski’s eulogy may be premature. 
Among the new technologies with the potential to adversely impact 
privacy is cloud computing.  In a cloud computing environment, a user’s 
documents are stored on a remote computer system operated and 
controlled by a third party.7  Two popular cloud computing applications, 
Apple’s iCloud and Dropbox (from the company of the same name), 
market their software by pointing out the convenience they afford.8  
Apple boasts that its iCloud service synchronizes a variety of data, 
including documents and web browser history, to all of a user’s devices 
with minimum setup.9  Dropbox advertises that “[a]ny file you save to 
Dropbox also instantly saves to your computers, phones, and the 
Dropbox website.”10  Cloud computing is not merely a niche technology 
either: millions of people use Dropbox today.11 
Convenient as this synchronization may be, it raises disturbing 
Fourth Amendment issues.  It also raises confusing statutory issues under 
 3 Alex Kozinski & Stephanie Grace, Pulling Plug on Privacy: How Technology Helped 
Make the Fourth Amendment Obsolete, THE DAILY (June 22, 2011), www.thedaily.com/page/ 
2011/06/22/062211-opinions-oped-privacy-kozinski-grace-1-2/. 
 4 Id. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6 A “smart phone” does not have a standardized definition, but it appears accepted in the 
field that a smart phone “combines the functions of a cellular phone and a handheld computer in a 
single device.” Michael Juntao Yuan, What Is a Smartphone, O’REILLY WIRELESS DEVCENTER, 
www.oreillynet.com/wireless/2005/08/23/whatissmartphone.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012). 
 7 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 05/2012 ON CLOUD 
COMPUTING, WP 196, at 5 (July 1, 2012), available at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf. 
 8 DROPBOX, TOUR, www.dropbox.com/tour/0 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 9 APPLE, ICLOUD FEATURES, www.apple.com/icloud/features/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 10 DROPBOX, FEATURES, www.dropbox.com/features (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 11 In January 2010, Dropbox announced that 4 million people used its service.  See Robin 
Wauters, Dropbox Announces 4 Million Users, Hires a VP from Salesforce, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 20, 
2010), techcrunch.com/2010/01/20/dropbox-4-million-user/. 
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a federal statute known informally as the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA).12  Enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA),13 SCA created a separate standard for obtaining a search 
warrant when the “effects” to be searched are electronic communications 
transmitted to, and stored with, a “remote computing service.”14 
In 1986, when digital information still resided in large data centers, 
the Fourth Amendment problem was limited, as the data stored in data 
centers were not readily transportable.15  Today, however, “essentially 
unlimited” online storage16 allows users not only to store copious 
amounts of data, but also to access those data from multiple places, 
including a mobile phone.17  As some courts have held that police may 
search the contents of a cellular phone incident to a lawful arrest,18 the 
question becomes how deep into a phone’s data the police can go, and 
whether that search is limited to information stored on the phone or 
information that is accessible by the phone. 
Arguably, information accessible by a mobile device but stored on a 
third-party server is an “electronic communication” within the meaning 
of the SCA.19  To a police officer trying to search a mobile device 
incident to an arrest, this presents a problem; cloud-stored information 
might be protected by the Fourth Amendment, but if it is not, the 
information may fall within the ambit of the SCA.  If the former, then 
absent an exception to the warrant requirement, police must obtain a 
warrant to search cloud-stored documents accessible by a phone.  If the 
latter, then more complex calculations become necessary.  If the data 
were in storage for less than 180 days, a warrant supported by probable 
cause may be required.20  But if the data were stored for more than 180 
days, a warrant is optional because police can obtain an administrative 
 12 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 tit. II, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2710 (Westlaw 2012)). 
 13 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848. 
 14 18 U.S.C.A. § 2711(2) (Westlaw 2012). 
 15 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17-
18 (statement of Richard Salgado, Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and Information Security, 
Google, Inc.), available at judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-149_58409.pdf. 
 16 Id. at 24 (statement of Mike Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation). 
 17 Id. at 10 (statement of Edward W. Felten, Director, Center for Information and 
Technology Policy, Princeton University). 
 18 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011). 
 19 Such communication is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, 
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 
2510(12) (Westlaw 2012); see also id. § 2510(14), (17). 
 20 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
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subpoena, which can be issued based on something less than probable 
cause.21  Or the information may not be protected at all. 
If the SCA does not govern a search incident to arrest, current law 
requires complex calculations that could result in the exclusion of 
evidence if police are too liberal when searching, or the potential loss of 
evidence if they are too conservative.  The exclusionary rule, designed 
by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, and made applicable to 
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, is a Fourth Amendment enforcement 
mechanism.22  The remedy for evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is to bar the prosecutor from using that evidence 
against the accused.23  Equally compelling is the prosecution’s interest in 
preventing a suspect from destroying evidence on his person or nearby, 
leading to the search-incident-to-arrest24 and automobile-search25 
doctrines.26  While the law is clear that police may search a suspect’s 
person incident to arrest, including any containers located thereon,27 the 
law is unclear as to whether a cell phone is just another container or a 
different beast with a separate set of search rules.28  The end result of this 
needlessly complex flowchart will be a rise in motions to exclude 
evidence at criminal trials.  Police on the beat must be able to make 
evidentiary decisions at a moment’s notice.29  This leads to disparate 
enforcement of the law. 
 21 Id. 
 22 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“In sum, the rule is a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”). 
 23 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If letters and private documents can 
thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection 
of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no 
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution.”); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961). 
 24 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 25 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2009). 
 26 See id. at 339 (describing the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine as “protecting arresting 
officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or 
destroy”). 
 27 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973). 
 28 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (Cal. 2011) (holding that a cell phone is 
searchable like any other container on suspect’s person); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 
2009) (holding that a cell phone is not akin to containers from prior case law and could not be 
searched without a warrant); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Ga. 2010) (holding that, 
even though a cell phone is like a container, that characterization allows police to search some, but 
not all, of the files on the device). 
 29 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A police officer’s determination as to how and where to 
search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which 
the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each 
step in the search.”). 
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This Comment argues that the current state of Fourth Amendment 
law vis-à-vis searching cloud-stored documents on a mobile device is 
untenable.30  Part I of this Comment defines cloud storage and cloud 
computing, and it provides background information on the SCA.  Part II 
discusses the intricacies of applying the SCA to computers and email, 
which is to date the best analog for applying the SCA to cloud 
computing.  Part III details the legislative and judicial solutions to the 
problems raised by new technology and concludes that, while new 
legislation is the most desirable response, in the meantime courts must 
rethink their notions of what it means to search a mobile device.  If either 
the legislature or the judiciary can reform a troubled Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as it relates to new technology, hope remains that reports 
of the Fourth Amendment’s death have been greatly exaggerated. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment does not require the government to obtain a 
warrant in all situations; only otherwise “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” require a warrant issued “upon probable cause.”31  The United 
States Supreme Court addressed the question of what constituted an 
unreasonable search in the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States.32  Roy 
Olmstead was accused of leading a conspiracy to import liquor into the 
United States during Prohibition.33  Federal prohibition officers had 
intercepted Olmstead’s telephone conversations by tapping into the 
telephone wires outside his office.34  This was accomplished without 
trespassing onto Olmstead’s property.35  In upholding Olmstead’s 
conviction, the Supreme Court found it dispositive that the government 
listened to his phone conversations “without trespass upon any property 
 30 What this Comment will not do is discuss privacy expectations relating to social media 
applications (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) that may be accessible by a mobile device.  In addition to 
being beyond the scope of a discussion of cloud-stored communications, it is highly likely that 
information posted to Facebook or Twitter carries with it no privacy expectation, as the user has 
intentionally placed the information on the Internet for all to see.  See, e.g., Bruce Clayton Newell, 
Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 17 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 
12 (2011); Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy.  Get over It!”  Would Warren 
and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146 (2011). 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 32 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 33 Id. at 456. 
 34 Id. at 456-57. 
 35 Id. at 457. 
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of the defendants,”36 emphasizing that the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment only if it interfered with the suspect’s property.37 
In 1967’s landmark Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
reversed Olmstead when it held that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”38  Federal agents, believing that Charles Katz was 
illegally transferring wagering information over the phone, attached an 
electronic listening device to the outside of the phone booth in which 
Katz made the illegal calls.39  Agents never interfered with the inside of 
the phone booth.40  However, for the Katz Court, the relevant inquiry 
was not whether Charles Katz had a property interest in the phone booth 
(or, even if he did, whether federal agents had to “trespass” into the 
phone booth to listen to the conversation), but rather whether a person 
who “occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the 
toll” is “entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world 41
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, concurring in the judgment, took 
this new doctrine even further, articulating the familiar two-pronged test 
that remains the standard for determining when the government has 
engaged in a Fourth Amendment search:42 “first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”43  As technology has advanced, the Court has relied on 
this test in determining, for example, whether warrantless searches using 
pen registers,44 heat-detection devices,45 and aerial surveillance46 violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 466 (“Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought 
to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless 
there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his 
tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of 
making a seizure.”). 
 38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 39 Id. at 348. 
 40 Id. at 352. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (“In determining whether a particular 
form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States.” (footnote and citation omitted)); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001). 
 43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 44 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
 45 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35. 
 46 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
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A. DEFINING THE CLOUD 
“The Cloud” is the popular name for any Internet-based location 
where data are stored.47  “Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.”48  Beyond merely 
providing storage, “cloud computing” can also refer to distributing 
processing tasks among many computing resources and then delivering 
the output to a client computer over a network.49  The network used to 
connect the elements of the Cloud can be private (used by a single 
organization), community (used by a set of specific individuals), public 
(usable by the general public), or a hybrid of the three.50  The Cloud 
discussed throughout this Comment is a public cloud consisting of the 
public Internet and a secure connection to a cloud storage service used by 
a subscriber of the cloud-storage service.51 
Cloud computing operates using a client-server architecture, where 
the server is a computer that stores and retrieves data, and a client—a 
computer or other device—requests data.52  A cloud computing “server” 
actually consists of dozens or hundreds of computer servers arranged in a 
huge cluster.53  This cluster of servers not only stores the data that clients 
access, but also contains applications that manage the data.54  The cloud 
computing service maintains a copy of a user’s files on the user’s device 
(e.g., computer, smart phone, tablet) and the cloud application 
 47 Walter S. Mossberg, Learning About Everything Under the “Cloud,” WALL ST. J., May 6, 
2010, available at online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703961104575226194192477512. 
html. 
 48 LEE BADGER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., CLOUD COMPUTING SYNOPSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS  2-1 (May 2012), available at csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
146/sp800-146.pdf. 
 49 Ian Foster et al., Cloud Computing and Grid Computing 360-Degree Compared, IEEE 
Grid Computing Environments (2008), available at arxiv.org/pdf/0901.0131.pdf.  For the purposes 
of this Comment, “cloud computing” will be limited to its storage implications. 
 50 BADGER ET AL., supra note 48, at 2-2. 
 51 Even though companies such as Dropbox or Google store data on their own servers, these 
networks are not considered “private,” as the services are available to the general public.  See PETER 
MELL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 3 
(Sept. 2011), available at csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
 52 Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
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synchronizes these copies with the copies stored on the remote server 
whenever the files change.55 
Cloud storage utilizes the storage capacity of off-site servers instead 
of the storage provided by the internal disks in a computer.56  Mobile 
devices, and even some smaller laptop computers, have limited storage 
capacity due to their small size and their necessarily small internal 
disks.57  Unlike a traditional computer, which stores its data on an 
internal hard drive, a mobile device like an iPhone often stores its data on 
a third-party server, accessing the data as necessary.58  Thus, as non-
computer mobile devices have become more popular, use of cloud-
storage services has increased as a necessity.59 
Users choose to store their information in the Cloud, and not on 
their computers, for a variety of reasons.  Information may be stored in 
the Cloud as a backup, in case the user’s computer is lost or damaged, 
making the information stored on the computer unrecoverable.60  
Businesses increasingly find cloud computing to be a cheap alternative to 
hosting large amounts of data and the requisite backup and retrieval 
hardware on-site.61  But even beyond the Cloud’s business solutions—
disaster recovery and saving money—users of all types find it convenient 
to access cloud-stored information wherever they have an Internet 
connection.62 
Cloud-stored information is typically encrypted, meaning it cannot 
be accessed without the password of the person who owns the 
information.63  This does not mean, however, that the information can 
never be accessed by anyone but the owner.  The Terms of Service 
(TOS) for Dropbox, one of the most popular file-storage services, 
explicitly state that its employees may “disclose to parties outside 
 55 For a description of how several cloud-computing services work, see generally Roger 
Spoor & Arjan Peddemors, Cloud Storage and Peer-to-Peer Storage: End-User Considerations and 
Product Overview, SURFNET (2010), available at www6.surfnet.nl/nl/Innovatieprogramma’s/ 
gigaport3/Documents/EDS-3R%20Cloud%20and%20p2p%20storage-v1.1.pdf. 
 56 Mossberg, supra note 47. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Allan Hoffman, Dropbox More Than a Convenience: Cloud Storage Service a Sign of the 
Times, THE STAR-LEDGER (Mar. 9, 2012), available at www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2012/03/ 
dropbox_more_than_a_convenienc.html. 
 60 Why Is Online Storage Becoming So Popular?, ONLINESTORAGE.ORG, www.online 
storage.org/why-is-online-storage-becoming-so-popular/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Online Storage vs. External Hard Drives, ONLINESTORAGE.ORG, www.onlinestorage. 
org/online-storage-vs-external-hard-drives/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 63 See, e.g., DROPBOX, HOW SECURE IS DROPBOX?, www.dropbox.com/help/27 (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2012). 
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Dropbox files stored in your Dropbox” for several reasons, one of which 
is to “comply with a law, regulation or compulsory legal request.”64  
Apple’s TOS for its iCloud service are substantially similar.65 
B. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
Integral to any examination of searches of electronically stored 
material is the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA).66  SCA was 
passed as part of an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which established the authority for 
federal wiretaps.67  Congress passed the SCA as primitive forms of 
electronic communication became prevalent, fearing that a person who 
handed computer information to a third party “may be subject to no 
constitutional privacy protection.”68  The SCA contains a strange 
idiosyncrasy, however: data that have been in electronic storage for less 
than 180 days can be obtained only with a warrant issued using either the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a 
state’s warrant procedures.69  Information that has been in storage for 
longer than 180 days, however, can be obtained using a federal or state 
administrative subpoena or a court order.70  In order to obtain 
electronically stored data under a court order, a state or federal 
governmental authority must show “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of 
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”71 
The reason for this disparity can be found in the SCA’s legislative 
history and the peculiarities of data storage at the time the SCA was 
passed.  The Senate observed, in 1986, that most data storage providers 
erased users’ information after three months “to ensure system 
integrity.”72  Consequently, it was unlikely that someone would need to 
store data with a third party for more than six months.  Erasing user data 
every three months was likely due to the prohibitive cost of data storage 
 64 DROPBOX, TERMS, www.dropbox.com/terms#privacy (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 65 APPLE, ICLOUD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, www.apple.com/legal/icloud/en/terms.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 66 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 tit. II, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2710 (Westlaw 2012)). 
 67 SEN. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986). 
 68 Id. at 3. 
 69 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 70 Id. § 2703(b). 
 71 Id. § 2703(d). 
 72 SEN. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3. 
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in 1986.73  Indeed, a contemporary magazine article noted, “Prices for 
hard disks in the 10- or 20-megabyte capacities range from $400 to 
$1,500 depending on access time, capacity, and other features.”74  
Compare this to a modern hard disk, which has a storage capacity of 2 
terabytes (approximately 100,000 times the capacity of a disk in 1986) 
and costs only about $100.75  Congress is aware that the SCA’s 180-day 
provision is problematic: two former U.S. Representatives observed that, 
when Congress passed the SCA in 1986, 
people assumed that emails remaining on a server were forgotten or 
unwanted, and it made some sense to impart a higher level of 
protection to newer emails stored for fewer than 180 days.  But today, 
with the nearly limitless storage capability that online services 
provide, the emails we save on the server are often the ones that are 
most important to us.76 
Combine the proliferation of cloud-stored data with the ubiquity and 
convenience of mobile devices, then add a dash of statutory language 
that even former members of Congress acknowledge is woefully out of 
date, and a recipe for constitutional disaster is cooked up as millions of 
Americans walk around town with personal data in their pockets that is 
readily available to law enforcement. 
II. APPLYING THE SCA TO MOBILE DEVICES INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Yet another wrinkle in the SCA involves the statute’s application to 
a search incident to an arrest.  The SCA’s very existence, and Congress’s 
desire to place stored communications within the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment, suggest that the SCA is the exclusive mechanism for law 
enforcement seeking to access stored communications.  This would seem 
to preclude the use of the common-law doctrine of search incident to 
arrest.  However, The SCA does not make it entirely clear whether a 
 73 Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 
14, 2012, 5:50 PM), thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-in-data-storage-have-
implications-for-government-surveillance/ (“Not so long ago, even the most aggressive government 
surveillance had to be selective: the cost of data storage was too high and the capacity too low to 
keep everything.”). 
 74 Selby Bateman, The Future of Mass Storage, COMPUTE! (Mar. 1986), available at 
www.atarimagazines.com/compute/issue70/054_1_THE_FUTURE_OF_MASS_STORAGE.php. 
 75 AMAZON.COM, www.amazon.com/Western-Digital-Caviar-Desktop-WD20EARX/dp/B00 
4VFJ9MK/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 76 Asa Hutchinson & Mickey Edwards, Get a Warrant: Congress Must Act To Protect 
Privacy in Digital Age, THE HILL (Oct. 25, 2011), thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/189737-get-a-warrant-
congress-must-act-to-protect-privacy-in-digital-age-. 
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warrant is always necessary to seize the material within its purview.77  
While “it is not presumed that the common law is changed by statutory 
enactment; and statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly 
construed,”78 the Supreme Court “has not simply frozen into 
constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the 
time of the Fourth Amendment’s passage.”79  Thus, it could be that the 
SCA may override the common law doctrine of search incident to 
arrest,80 placing a Dropbox or iCloud user’s documents outside the reach 
of such a search. 
In United States v. Robinson, the United States Supreme Court held 
that when a person is searched incident to a lawful arrest, “It is the fact of 
custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search. . . .”81  Indeed, 
in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, “a full search of the person is not 
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”82  Cases post-
Robinson have made fine distinctions as to how far outside the physical 
boundaries of a “person” police could go in a search incident to arrest.83 
State courts have recently become the arena for disputes 
surrounding police searches of cell phones incident to arrest.84  The arena 
is a mess.  In People v. Diaz, the California Supreme Court decided that 
police may search the contents of a cell phone incident to a lawful arrest, 
although the case dealt solely with text messages stored on the phone.85  
Conversely, the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Smith that “because 
 77 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012): “A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant . . .” (emphasis added).  This language suggests that the 
only way in which the government can obtain electronic communications, as defined by the SCA, is 
through the warrant procedures specified by the SCA. 
 78 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (7th ed. 2007). 
 79 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
571 n.33 (1980)). 
 80 The Supreme Court recognized the existence of such a doctrine at common law in Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
 81 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 82 Id. at 235. 
 83 See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804-09 (1974) (holding that taking Edwards’s 
clothing in order to subject it to a lab analysis was not a search); United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 
662 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a purse is within an arrestee’s immediate 
control, not an element of her clothing or person); United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that search of suspect’s wallet was permissible as a search of his person incident 
to arrest); United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a search of 
Castro’s wallet was permissible as a search of his person incident to arrest). 
 84 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. 
2010); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
 85 Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505-06. 
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a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell phone’s contents, 
police must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s 
contents.”86  The Court of Appeals of Georgia apparently decided to split 
the difference, holding in Hawkins v. State that police did not have 
authority to search the entire contents of a cell phone, but only those 
contents “that might reasonably contain the object of the search.”87  
Federal courts are similarly divided over whether the contents of cell 
phones can be searched incident to a lawful arrest.88 
Justice Werdegar, dissenting in Diaz, posited the very problem that 
this Comment addresses: “Never before has it been possible to carry so 
much personal or business information in one’s pocket or purse.  The 
potential impairment to privacy if arrestees’ mobile phones and handheld 
computers are treated like clothing or cigarette packages, fully searchable 
without probable cause or a warrant, is correspondingly great.”89  But 
Diaz dealt only with the information stored on the phone itself.90  Justice 
Werdegar’s statements are even more applicable to the world of the 
Cloud, where the storage capacity is, for all practical purposes, infinite. 
A. THE SCA AS APPLIED TO CLOUD COMPUTING 
It is unclear what would happen if a court faced the issue of 
applying the SCA to cloud-based services accessible by a mobile device.  
There are two issues involved in searching a mobile device incident to 
arrest.  First, as noted above, is the problem presented by Diaz and Smith: 
whether a mobile device can be searched incident to arrest without a 
warrant.91  But another issue, yet unanswered, is whether cloud-stored 
documents, specifically, can be searched incident to an arrest on a mobile 
device, or any device that connects to the Cloud, and whether the SCA 
even applies to cloud-stored documents. 
In answering this question, email provides the best available 
analogy.  An email provider falls within the scope of the SCA’s 
 86 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955. 
 87 Hawkins, 704 S.E.2d at 892. 
 88 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that police had 
authority to examine contents of Finley’s phone without a warrant); United States v. Hill, 2011 WL 
90130, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (holding that a cellular phone should be considered part of a 
person’s clothing and thus subject to a warrantless search incident to arrest). Contra Schlossberg v. 
Solesbee, 844 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1169-71 (D. Or. 2012) (adopting Smith and Park’s holding due to the 
volume of information a cellular phone can hold); United States v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (holding that a cellular phone should not be considered part of a person’s 
clothing “due to the quantity and quality of information that can be stored”). 
 89 Diaz, 244 P.3d at 514 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 90 Id. at 502-03 (majority opinion). 
 91 Id. at 503; Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 950-51. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/4
2013] Castle in the Cloud 273 
 
definition of a “remote computing service,” as it provides “to the 
public . . . computer storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system.”92  The legal protections, if any, of 
email rely on an analogy to postal mail, a field where privacy 
expectations are well-established.93  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces noted, in United States v. Maxwell, that “[email] 
transmissions are not unlike other forms of modern communication.  We 
can draw parallels from these other mediums.”94  As it stands now, case 
law surrounding the search of email is probably the best clue to where 
the law is going, and where the law should probably not go, involving a 
search of cloud-stored information accessible by a mobile device.  If 
email is afforded blanket protection under the Fourth Amendment, then 
so too should cloud-stored data. 
B. UNITED STATES V. WARSHAK FINDS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN EMAIL 
The judiciary has been slow to recognize that electronic information 
should be afforded the same Fourth Amendment protections as other 
types of “real-world” data.95  Recently, the Sixth Circuit recognized a 
Fourth Amendment right to the privacy in email stored with an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) in United States v. Warshak.96  Steven Warshak 
was accused of mail and bank fraud for operating a business that 
distributed herbal supplements for male sexual enhancement.97  As part 
of its investigation, the United States procured 27,000 of Warshak’s 
private emails using an administrative subpoena, which was permitted by 
the SCA.98  Warshak sought to suppress these emails as the result of an 
illegal search.99  The Sixth Circuit found that, while Warshak did have a 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the emails, because the 
government relied on the SCA in good faith, Warshak’s conviction 
should not be reversed.100  Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held, “to the 
 92 18 U.S.C.A. § 2711(2) (Westlaw 2012). 
 93 See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, ACLU of Ohio Foundation, 
Inc., American Civil Liberties Union, & Center for Democracy & Technology Supporting the 
Appellee & Urging Affirmance at 4, United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010) (No. 06-4092), 
available at www.eff.org/files/filenode/warshak_v_usa/warshak_amicus.pdf. 
 94 United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 95 See id. at 418 (holding that the sender of an email message has a right to the privacy of its 
contents). 
 96 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 97 Id. at 274. 
 98 Id. at 282. 
 99 Id. at 281. 
 100 Id. at 282. 
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extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such 
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”101 
Even though the Warshak court affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
by holding that the government relied in good faith on the SCA’s 
constitutionality, the court set a precedent for future email privacy cases 
in the Sixth Circuit.102  What is most important about Warshak is its 
reasoning.  Applying the Katz test, the court found that Warshak did have 
a subjective expectation of privacy in his emails: “Given the often 
sensitive and sometimes damning substance of his emails, we think it 
highly unlikely that Warshak expected them to be made public, for 
people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry in plain view.”103 
The court also found, under the second prong of Katz, that this was 
a privacy expectation society recognized as reasonable.104  The Katz 
Court, forty-three years earlier, based its decision in part on “the vital 
role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication.”105  The Warshak court applied this same criterion to 
email, concluding that: 
Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have waned 
in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication has 
taken place.  People are now able to send sensitive and intimate 
information, instantaneously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a 
world away.  Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap 
ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button.  Commerce has 
also taken hold in email.  Online purchases are often documented in 
email accounts, and email is frequently used to remind patients and 
clients of imminent appointments.  In short, “account” is an apt word 
for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email 
account, as it provides an account of its owner’s life.  By obtaining 
access to someone’s email, government agents gain the ability to peer 
deeply into his activities.106 
Warshak’s use of Katz’s language about the expanded role of 
telephones in communication suggests that a “ubiquity check” is folded 
into the second prong of the test.  The fact that email in 2010 was as 
common a medium of communication as the telephone in 1967 bolsters 
the reasonableness of society’s privacy expectation in email.  
 101 Id. at 288. 
 102 Id. at 292. 
 103 Id. at 284 (footnote omitted). 
 104 Id. at 285-86. 
 105 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 106 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284. 
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Consequently, “[a]s some forms of communication begin to diminish, the 
Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that 
arise.”107  Thus, the more useful and potentially indispensable a 
technology becomes to personal communication, commercial 
communication, or both, the more it is afforded Fourth Amendment 
protection.108 
If Warshak were merely a vanilla case of a warrantless search under 
the Fourth Amendment, that would be the end of it; “[t]he government 
may not compel a commercial [Internet Service Provider] to turn over 
the contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant 
based on probable cause.”109  But the Sixth Circuit had to face the SCA, 
which gave the government the authority (the government thought) to 
obtain Warshak’s emails.110  Although the Sixth Circuit found that 
Warshak had an expectation of privacy in his email, that expectation was 
irrelevant in the face of the government’s good-faith reliance on the 
SCA, even though the Court found the SCA unconstitutional.111 
Cloud computing, though, might be a different animal altogether.  
There are easy analogies to be made (and Warshak makes them in 
coming to its conclusion112) between email and traditional postal mail.  
Postal mail has a long and storied history of use, making it something 
that courts understand.113  Email, like regular mail, is a transmission 
from one person to another.114  The sender intends for only one person, 
the recipient, to ever read that transmission.115  A cloud storage system, 
on the other hand, is more like a bank deposit box: its contents, though 
 107 Id. at 286. 
 108 “Wait a minute,” the reader might say at this point, “what about the Court’s opinion in 
Kyllo v. United States?  Wasn’t there an expectation of privacy there because a thermal imaging gun 
was not in common use?  Doesn’t ubiquity cut both ways, resulting in inconsistent application?”  
This Comment, as well as the SCA, deals only with communications and not intrusive physical 
searches per se.  Thermal imaging guns are hardly “indispensable” to communication and do not 
play a vital role in private communication.  Moreover, the Court’s opinion in Kyllo had much more 
to do with the imaging gun’s invasion of the home than with its invasion of privacy in general.  See 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-41 (2001). 
 109 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
 110 Id. at 282. 
 111 Id. at 290. 
 112 See id. at 285-86 (“Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in 
which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy.” (quoting Jacobsen v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984))). 
 113 Brief for Professors of Electronic Privacy Law & Internet Law as Amici Curiae Supporting 
the Appellee & Urging Affirmance at 13, United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010) (No. 06-
4092), available at www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/warshak_v_usa/amicus_final_law 
_profs.pdf. 
 114 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285. 
 115 United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
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accessible by a third party, are intended to be viewed only by the owner 
of the deposit box.116  Using Dropbox or iCloud to save a document does 
not entail the intent to transmit that document’s contents from one person 
to another, but rather to store that document in a safe place for later 
retrieval by the person who put it there originally.  Even under this 
premise, such a document still has Fourth Amendment protection.117 
C. THE UNCERTAIN DEFINITION OF “ELECTRONIC STORAGE” 
Even though the Fourth Amendment and its associated case law 
should circumscribe the boundaries of cloud-storage searches, statutes 
like the SCA complicate an already complicated area of the law.  The 
SCA carves out exceptions for certain types of searches but not others.118  
In examining the propriety of searching cloud-stored files on a mobile 
device without a warrant, a threshold issue is whether these types of data 
fall within one of these exceptions. 
The SCA defines “electronic storage” both as “any temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to 
the electronic transmission thereof” and “any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of 
backup protection of such communication.”119  It is this second clause of 
the SCA’s definition of electronic storage that causes trouble, because 
the language of the statute may actually exempt some types of cloud-
stored data from protection. 
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether 
email messages stored on an ISP’s remote email server until delivery 
were in “electronic storage” in light of case law holding that undelivered 
 116 See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-Mail, 
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 165-66 (2008) (“[O]ne does not engage the third party because one 
wants the intermediary to have access; that access is a required means of effectuating the customer’s 
interests.  The same can be said of the user of a storage locker, a rental property, or a safe deposit 
box.  The customer’s interest in making use of the service necessitates the involvement of the third 
party.  Of course, the same may be said of the ISP customer; she engages with the ISP out of the 
desire to use its intermediary services.”).  Warshak cites to this article in order to demonstrate that 
stored email is akin not only to a postal letter, but also to any other thing entrusted to a third party for 
delivery or storage. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
 117 See Brief for Professors of Electronic Privacy Law & Internet Law as Amici Curiae 
Supporting the Appellee & Urging Affirmance, supra note 113, at 13-14 (“[W]hen someone 
maintains personal property on a third party’s premises, she retains an expectation of privacy in it, so 
long as the property is secured against others’ access and the third party’s right of access to the 
premises is limited.”). 
 118 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (Westlaw 2012) and its divergent treatment of information that is 
newer or older than 180 days.  The SCA also narrowly circumscribes what falls within its scope. See 
generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (Westlaw 2012). 
 119 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (Westlaw 2012). 
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emails were in “temporary, intermediate storage.”120  Finding that the 
emails were “stored ‘by an electronic communication service’ within the 
meaning of” the SCA,121 the Ninth Circuit determined that the second 
clause of the definition of electronic storage—that data stored by an 
electronic communication service be stored “for purposes of backup 
protection”—applies to data only if it is being stored for the purpose of 
being backed up.122  Furthermore, this intent to store data for backup 
protection must be the motivating reason for storage and not just another 
possible reason for storage; in order to fall within the scope of the SCA, 
“the mere fact that a copy could serve as a backup does not mean it is 
stored for that purpose.”123 
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, a “backup” consists of “storing a 
message on an ISP’s server after delivery [in order] to provide a second 
copy of the message in the event that the user needs to download it 
again—if, for example, the message is accidentally erased from the 
user’s own computer.”124  A “backup” under the SCA thus requires both 
temporary storage data coupled with an intent to store those data in case 
a user (or, as the court concedes, the ISP) needs to access it again.125  A 
copy of data stored for any other reason is, conceivably, not protected.126 
In an aside that was not applicable in Theofel, but could be 
applicable to future cloud computing cases, the Theofel court considered 
the possibility that “[a] remote computing service might be the only 
place a user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not stored 
for backup purposes.”127  This musing describes the cloud computing 
dilemma perfectly.  People use cloud services for a variety of reasons, 
including, but not limited to, backing up information.128  A person could 
also store information in the Cloud for ease of access from multiple 
devices.129  Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the SCA, such a 
use of the Cloud would not fall within the scope of the SCA, because the 
data were not stored solely for “backup purposes.” 
 120 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1076. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 1075. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. at 1076 (“[T]he lifespan of a backup is necessarily tied to that of the underlying 
message.  Where the underlying message has expired in the normal course, any copy is no longer 
performing any backup function.  An ISP that kept permanent copies of temporary messages could 
not fairly be described as ‘backing up’ those messages.”). 
 127 Id. at 1077. 
 128 Why Is Online Storage Becoming So Popular?, supra note 60. 
 129 Id. 
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When it comes to cloud computing, a file located on the remote 
servers of companies such as Dropbox is “not stored for backup 
purposes,” but is in fact constantly updated as the Dropbox software, 
installed on a user’s computer or smart phone, monitors the local file for 
changes and updates the server’s copy as necessary.130  Herein lies the 
problem: in the Ninth Circuit, any non-backup data stored with a remote 
computing service may very well fall outside the statute’s scope.  Given 
that Congress’s intention in crafting the SCA was to bring certainty to a 
new, uncertain area of technology,131 it is woefully ironic that the 
statute’s own language puts the very data it sought to protect out of its 
reach. 
The court’s aside in Theofel—that a user could potentially store all 
of his or her data on a remote computer, meaning that it is not backed 
up132—has started to hit home.  United States v. Weaver was a child-
pornography prosecution in which the government subpoenaed the 
defendant’s email from Microsoft, the operator of the Hotmail email 
service, pursuant to the less-stringent SCA requirement.133  The question 
for the court was, as in Theofel, whether the emails in question were in 
“electronic storage” under the SCA: “If the emails the Government 
requested here are in electronic storage, Microsoft need not produce 
them without a warrant, but if they are held or maintained solely to 
provide the customer storage or computer processing services, Microsoft 
must comply with the Government’s subpoena.”134 
In Weaver, however, the defendant did not download the emails to 
his computer; instead, he viewed them from Hotmail’s web interface.135  
Therefore, the copy held by Hotmail was not merely a backup copy; it 
was the only copy, and in that case, “Microsoft [was] not storing [his] 
opened messages for backup purposes. Instead, Microsoft [was] 
maintaining the messages ‘solely for the purpose of providing storage or 
computer processing services to such subscriber or customer.’”136  The 
Weaver court nevertheless looked to the legislative history of the SCA 
and concluded that “if the Stored Communications Act drafters intended 
emails a user leaves on an email service for re-access at a later date to be 
 130 Idilio Drago et al., Inside Dropbox: Understanding Personal Cloud Storage Services 3, 
International Measurement Conference (2012), www.tlc-networks.polito.it/oldsite/mellia/papers/ 
DropboxImc12.pdf. 
 131 SEN. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986). 
 132 Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077. 
 133 United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 769-70 (C.D. Ill. 2009). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 772. 
 136 Id. 
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covered by section 2702(a)(2), they also must have intended them to be 
covered by the Government’s trial subpoena power.”137 
III. SOLUTIONS: SEEKING CERTAINTY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 
As Judge Kozinski pointed out in United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc. (known popularly as the BALCO case), “It’s no 
answer to suggest . . . that people can avoid these hazards by not storing 
their data electronically.”138  The Cloud is here to stay, and with it must 
come strong, clear privacy protections for cloud-stored data. 
Consider the situation in which Susie Citizen is pulled over by the 
city police for a traffic violation.  Officer Friendly looks up Susie’s name 
on his police computer and finds that she has a valid, outstanding arrest 
warrant because she failed to show up in court pursuant to a 
misdemeanor littering citation.  Officer Friendly performs a custodial 
arrest of Susie and finds her iPhone in her pocket.  Because current law 
permits him to examine the contents of containers on her person, he 
slides the virtual slider to get to the phone’s home screen. 
Officer Friendly opens up the Pages application, a word processor.  
This application’s documents are stored in Apple’s iCloud, not on the 
phone.  The first document that appears is a list of Susie’s crack cocaine 
clients and their outstanding balances with Susie.  At a motion to 
suppress this evidence, Susie argues that she had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of her iPhone, and none of the case 
law deals with information obtained by police that was not stored on the 
phone. 
In the Ninth Circuit, a document stored on a cloud service may or 
may not be searchable under the SCA, depending on the user’s intent in 
placing the document in the Cloud in the first place.  Different 
interpretations of the same statute do not make for efficient law 
enforcement, especially for police in the field, who must make split-
second decisions.  Failing to document relevant evidence might lead to 
its destruction by the suspect before a warrant can be obtained; 
examining evidence that is protected by the Fourth Amendment could 
lead to the exclusion of relevant evidence.139  Because the law is in flux, 
it is hard for the “cop on the beat” to know what to do.  “Clear rules 
announce ex ante what the police can and cannot do; so long as the 
 137 Id. at 773.  It is difficult to say, however, what Congress intended with regard to modern 
email storage in 1986, as modern email systems did not exist. 
 138 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 139 See discussion of the exclusionary rule, supra, note 23 and accompanying text. 
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police comply with the clear rules, the police will know that the evidence 
cannot be excluded.”140  Requiring police to go through a complex 
flowchart of possible options (e.g., whether a document has been stored 
for longer than 180 days or even if such a document is electronically 
stored) does no one—police or civilians—any good.  There must be a 
clear set of rules that, “in most instances, makes it possible to reach a 
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is 
justified in the interest of law enforcement.”141 
In terms of policies that police can follow, the solutions will be 
either legislative or judicial.  As the SCA is a federal law, Congress 
would have to address the statute’s deficiencies.  Alternatively, courts 
could avoid the SCA altogether and opt for an approach based on Katz’s 
two-prong test.142  Or courts could reasonably conclude that a cell phone 
with cloud accessibility is too much like a computer to permit police to 
search it without a warrant; such a request is not outrageous, as the Ohio 
Supreme Court reached that conclusion with phones that were not 
connected to the Internet.143  Any resultant policy will have to be simple 
and straightforward. 
A. AMENDING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
As this Comment is being written, legal organizations like the 
ACLU, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and the Digital Due 
Process Coalition are hard at work crafting legislation to update the 
SCA.144  In May 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011.145  The bill 
would have eliminated the SCA’s peculiar 180-day provision and would 
have mandated that the contents of stored communications be obtained 
pursuant to a probable-cause warrant.146  However, the proposed 
legislation would have permitted an administrative subpoena to be used 
to obtain identification information, such as the subscriber’s name, 
address, or telephone number.147 
 140 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 528 
(2007). 
 141 Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)). 
 142 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 143 “Although cell phones cannot be equated with laptop computers, their ability to store large 
amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of 
privacy in the information they contain.” State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009). 
 144 DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (Oct. 14, 2012), digitaldueprocess.org. 
 145 Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 146 Id. § 3. 
 147 Id. 
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In introducing the bill, Senator Leahy noted that, “[u]nder the 
current law, a single e-mail could be subject to as many a four different 
levels of privacy protections, depending upon where it is stored and 
when it was sent.”148  This bill, however, does not clarify the meanings 
of phrases like “electronic storage.”149  It also would permit exceptions 
to disclosure, including delayed notification (a search-warrant technique 
in which the person whose data are the subject of the search is notified of 
the search only after it has taken place).150 
Professor Orin S. Kerr has expressed a dislike for the judicial 
approach to crafting Fourth Amendment protection, noting that statutes 
have been historically more important in crafting Fourth Amendment 
policy than case law.151  For example, he observes that the history of 
wiretapping law, from Olmstead to Katz, “has remained a primarily 
statutory field governed by statutory commands.  Indeed, it turns out that 
very few cases in the history of wiretapping law have ruled that a 
wiretapping practice violated the Fourth Amendment.”152  Professor Kerr 
makes much of Chief Justice Taft’s helpful suggestion to Congress at the 
end of Olmstead: 
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by 
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal 
criminal trials, by direct legislation and thus depart from the common 
law of evidence.  But the courts may not adopt such a policy by 
attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth 
Amendment.153 
After Olmstead, Congress took Chief Justice Taft’s advice and 
passed the first federal wiretapping law in 1934.154  Even post-Katz, 
Congress has “taken the lead” in creating statutory privacy rights more 
protective than those offered by the Fourth Amendment.155 
The legislative approach would be ideal, as the legislature is in a 
position to create a rule governing a situation before it happens, while 
courts are necessarily reactive, responding only to a putative violation 
 148 157 CONG. REC. S3054-01 (daily ed. May 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 149 Nowhere within S. 1011 is there an updated or clearer definition of “electronic storage,” 
leaving open the problem from Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Where a 
document not stored specifically for backup purposes might not be protected by the SCA. 
 150 Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act, S. 1011 § 4. 
 151 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 839 (2004). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 845 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928)). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 855. 
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that has already happened.156  Well-crafted legislation could resolve the 
SCA’s problems, including the 180-day provision, as well as the 
ambiguity over what “electronic storage” is.  Such legislation would 
recognize that data are placed in electronic storage because we wish to 
keep them safe.  Legislative rules, and not a myriad of different judicial 
opinions, would ostensibly provide the stability that police need in order 
to operate. 
Representative Zoe Lofgren of California recently introduced the 
ECPA 2.0 Act of 2012 into the House of Representatives.  The Act 
would update the SCA by eliminating the 180-day distinction, requiring 
law enforcement to obtain a warrant for all electronically stored data.157  
Representative Lofgren’s attempt to update the SCA is laudable, but its 
detractors are powerful.  Senator Leahy’s 2011 measure faced opposition 
from such groups as the National District Attorneys’ Association and the 
National Sheriffs’ Association.158  The United States Department of 
Justice opposed changes to the ECPA on the ground that “changes could 
adversely affect the critical goal of protecting public safety and the 
national security of the United States.”159 
B. APPLYING KATZ AND TRADITIONAL SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST 
CASE LAW 
Legislation may not be forthcoming, or the resultant legislation 
could make things worse.  Cloud-stored documents must be protected 
somehow, and in a scenario in which legislation is nonexistent, or fails to 
recognize a constitutional privacy right in cloud-stored data, the judiciary 
would have to provide the protection. 
In the interplay between the Supreme Court and Congress, there is a 
period where the law is either unclear or undesirable; for example, post-
Olmstead, there was a six-year period in which law enforcement could 
wiretap with abandon before Congress passed the first wiretapping 
laws.160  Post-Warshak, the SCA is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it 
purports to allow officials to obtain email without a warrant, but only in 
 156 Id. at 868. 
 157 ECPA 2.0 Act, H.R. 6529, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012). 
 158 Declan McCullagh, Senate Delays Netflix, E-mail Privacy Fix After Cops Protest, CNET 
(Sept. 20, 2012, 11:07 AM), news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57517033-38/senate-delays-netflix-e-
mail-privacy-fix-after-cops-protest/. 
 159 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting 
Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) 
(statement of  James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Attorney General). 
 160 Kerr, supra note 151, at 845. 
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the Sixth Circuit.161  Justice Alito, concurring in United States v. Jones, 
observed that, in the absence of legislation, “the best that [the Court] can 
do” is apply existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in determining 
when there has been a search.162  With the SCA already in existence, it is 
hard to say that there is no legislation governing the situation at issue; 
however, the SCA’s deficiencies—especially where SCA provisions 
contradict the Fourth Amendment—are perhaps worse than having no 
legislation at all. 
In the absence of legislation, Katz provides an adequate test for 
determining a person’s privacy expectations in a new technology.  The 
Warshak court implied that Katz includes a “future-proof” mechanism.163  
When deciding whether a privacy right in a new technology is a right 
that society is prepared to recognize as a reasonable, courts should 
examine “the vital role that the [new technology] has come to play in 
private communication.”164  In this way, complex new technology can be 
afforded Fourth Amendment protection by answering two simple 
questions: Did this person believe his or her communication transmitted 
by this technology was private?  Does society think that is a reasonable 
belief? 
There are benefits to applying Katz directly.  The Katz test has been 
with us for more than forty years, meaning that police departments are 
familiar with it.165  Katz alleviates the need for constant legislative 
updates, as the second prong—the objective expectation of privacy—
automatically changes as society changes.  Presumably, as a particular 
communications technology becomes more useful and ubiquitous, 
society’s reliance on it increases, and so too does society’s reasonable 
expectation that communications will remain private.166  Under Katz, 
Officer Friendly’s warrantless search was likely impermissible, as there 
was no exigency and society recognizes that Susie’s expectation of 
privacy in storing her documents on Apple’s iCloud is reasonable. 
 161 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 162 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 163 See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“As some forms of communication begin to 
diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that arise.”). 
 164 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).  Note that the inquiry here is focused on 
“communication” and not merely “storage” or “presence.”  Applying Katz’s future-proofing to Diaz 
and Smith, where the information physically resided on the mobile device, is another topic, for 
another day. 
 165 Kerr, supra note 140, at 526-27. 
 166 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286. 
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Katz also has its problems, not the least of which is its inconsistent 
application.167  Even though the Katz Court professed to have abandoned 
the old property-based notion of privacy from Olmstead, the Supreme 
Court has continued to invoke property law in Fourth Amendment cases 
in determining whether a search was unreasonable.168  An officer relying 
on Katz might have no way of knowing, before conducting her or his 
search, whether the search was constitutional. 
However, a court can sidestep the traditional search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine altogether.  This is why the various cell phone cases came 
to different results.169  For every Smith (in which the Ohio Supreme 
Court said a warrant was required to search the contents of a phone), 
there is a Finley (in which the Fifth Circuit upheld the characterization of 
a cell phone as a searchable container found on the arrestee’s person).170  
In cases where courts have decided that police can rifle through a cell 
phone’s contents, it is the phone’s location, rather than its character, that 
has been the benchmark.171  That is, because Officer Friendly found the 
phone on Susie’s person, prior case law suggests that every bit of data 
accessible by the phone, irrespective of its actual location, is fair game 
for a search.172 
 167 Professor Kerr observes, “Katz is a Rorschach test.  Its vague language can support a 
narrow or broad reading equally well.”  Kerr, supra note 151, at 822. 
 168 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that 
the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure.”). Contra Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (use of a thermal 
imaging device was a search because it was a “physical invasion of the structure of the home”); 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (holding that Katz did not overrule the 
common-law doctrine of trespass as applied to rendering a search reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment).  See generally Daniel Zamani, There’s an Amendment for That: A Comprehensive 
Application of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169, 
174-75 (2010). 
 169 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (Cal. 2011) (holding that a cell phone was 
searchable like any other container on suspect’s person); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 
(Ga. 2010) (holding that, even though a cell phone is like a container, that characterization does not 
give police carte blanche to examine all the files on the device, but it allows police to examine some 
files); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (holding that a cell phone was not akin to 
containers from prior case law and could not be searched without a warrant). 
 170 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).  Contra United States v. Finley, 477 
F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 171 See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (cell phone found on a suspect’s person is akin to a 
container found on a suspect’s person). 
 172 Diaz, 244 P.3d at 509 (“These arguments [that the court should distinguish between the 
phone and its contents] are inconsistent with the high court’s decisions.  Those decisions hold that 
the loss of privacy upon arrest extends beyond the arrestee’s body to include ‘personal property . . . 
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee’ at the time of arrest.”). 
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C. SIDESTEPPING ROBINSON: “TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY” AND 
UNDERSTANDING THAT A PHONE IS NOT A WALLET 
Other than seeking legislative change, some scholars advocate an 
approach that might satisfy even a Finley-type court.  Professor Kerr has 
suggested a principle of “technology neutrality,” under which “the 
degree of privacy the Fourth Amendment extends to the Internet should 
try to match the degree of privacy protection that the Fourth Amendment 
provides in the physical world.”173  A typical search-and-seizure 
situation depends on the physical limits of an object.  “A search incident 
to arrest includes the physically grabbable area near the arrestee, but 
generally no further.  A search warrant must describe the physical place 
to be searched with particularity, generally approving searches the 
physical scale of a single home or property but rarely m 174
On the Internet, however, “electronic data has no inherent 
limitations on how much can exist, where it can be located, and where it 
can be stored.”175  This disconnect gives rise to a Fourth Amendment 
problem in terms of the Cloud, where there are no physical limitations.  
Searching cloud-stored documents on a mobile device can be 
accomplished in minutes and not the weeks it would take to search an 
equivalent amount of documents in the physical world.176 Even though 
the phone is “physically grabbable,” the data may not be—indeed, it is 
likely that the data are located in a different jurisdiction.177 
Analogizing a phone to a wallet is not the result of a 
misunderstanding about whether a phone is a wallet, but rather the result 
of jurisprudence that has failed to keep up with the types of technologies 
that can transform a wallet-sized object into a file-cabinet-type object.  
Courts that look at the size and location of a mobile device (e.g., whether 
it is on the person, in a purse, or in the car seat next to the suspect) focus 
 173 Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2010); see also ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, supra note 15, at 24 (statement of David Schellhase, Executive Vice President and 
General Counsel, Salesforce.com). 
 174 Kerr, supra note 173, at 1014. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Police can use devices such as the Cellebrite UFED, the subject of an ACLU lawsuit in 
Michigan, to extract the entire contents of a cell phone within minutes.  ACLU Concerned over 
Michigan State Police Extracting Data from Cellphones, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011, 4:50 PM), 
latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/04/aclu-concerned-over-michigan-state-police-
extracting-phone-data.html. 
 177 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 15, at 
107 (written statement of Thomas B. Hurbanek, Senior Investigator, New York State Police 
Computer Crime Unit). 
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too much on what Professor Kerr calls the “inside/outside distinction,” 
which defines the parameters of a Fourth Amendment search in terms of 
what a human being can generally see with his or her eyes: 
Outside spaces are open to visual observation.  The officer can use the 
surveillance tool of his eyes to see what is there.  In contrast, closed 
spaces are closed from visual observation; the officer cannot see what 
is inside the enclosure.  To see what is behind the barrier, the officer 
needs to break into the house, jimmy open the car trunk, unseal the 
letter, or otherwise break through the physical barrier that blocks his 
eyes from being able to see evidence inside.178 
The Internet has rendered this definition of a “search” as 
“break[ing] through the physical barrier” meaningless.179  Technology 
neutrality does not look at the physical character of the device storing the 
information, but rather creates a blanket protection for “content,” that is, 
the substantive information that a person seeks to protect.180 
Not everyone believes in crafting a new rule for “electronic 
containers.”  Byron Kish, writing in Catholic University Law Review, 
argues that a cellular phone is a container because it “can physically hold 
objects, for example, in a hidden compartment” and also because it 
“contains electronic information that can be reproduced in physical 
form.”181  This view, however, also falls victim to the problems 
associated with creating analogies.  A mobile device could be searched 
for hidden compartments containing tangible, real-world objects (like a 
scrap of paper), but that would not affect the files on the device or stored 
in the Cloud, and the cloud-stored information would be intact.  As for 
reproduction in physical form, documents and photographs could be 
downloaded from the device and printed, but this would make little 
sense, as people use the Cloud to obviate the need for maintaining 
physical copies of documents.182 
The Supreme Court, despite Judge Kozinski’s pessimism, seems 
prepared to recognize that new technology requires new rules.  The two 
concurrences in the recent United States v. Jones decision suggest as 
much: Justice Sotomayor noted that “the same technological advances 
that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also 
 178 Kerr, supra note 173, at 1011. 
 179 Id. at 1017-18. 
 180 Id. at 1020. 
 181 Byron Kish, Cellphone Searches: Works Like a Computer, Protected Like a Pager?, 60 
CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 469 (2011). 
 182 Paul Mah, Three Benefits of Saving Files in the Cloud, IT BUSINESS EDGE (Nov. 28, 
2012), www.itbusinessedge.com/blogs/smb-tech/three-benefits-of-saving-files-in-the-cloud.html. 
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affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy 
expectations.”183  Justice Alito, concurring separately, agreed with the 
ultimate outcome but doubted the utility of the majority’s property-based 
approach, especially since the search method employed—a GPS tracking 
device—was so far removed from anything known at common law.184 
Justice Alito’s offhand comment about a tiny constable or the very 
large coach, in addition to being entertaining, is also instructive.185  The 
analogies used in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence deal with size, 
location, or other attributes of the physical world and not enough with 
the nature or use of the thing searched.186  Cloud-stored documents can, 
and should, be afforded constitutional protection from warrantless 
searches under a theory that the police could not search a warehouse or a 
closed file cabinet without a warrant. 
Notwithstanding cases like Finley, courts appear to be prepared to 
acknowledge the differences between phones and cigarette packs, pagers, 
or footlockers.  As the federal district court in Oregon recently observed, 
the storage capability of an electronic device is not limited by physical 
size as a container is.  In order to carry the same amount of personal 
information contained in many of today’s electronic devices in a 
container, a citizen would have to travel with one or more large 
suitcases, if not file cabinets.187 
Attaching an Internet connection to this container expands the 
capacity by many orders of magnitude to the point where the analogy 
breaks down solely on a common-sense level.  Quite simply, “[a]n 
analogy between a computer and a container oversimplifies a complex 
area of Fourth Amendment doctrine and ignores the realities of massive 
modern computer storage.”188 
 183 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 184 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 185 Id. at 958 n.3 (responding to the majority’s assertion that common law could have 
contemplated round-the-clock vehicle surveillance by noting, “The Court suggests that something 
like this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very 
tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.”). 
 186 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (“Given their unique nature as 
multifunctional tools, cell phones defy easy categorization. On one hand, they contain digital address 
books very much akin to traditional address books carried on the person, which are entitled to a 
lower expectation of privacy in a search incident to an arrest. On the other hand, they have the ability 
to transmit large amounts of data in various forms, likening them to laptop computers, which are 
entitled to a higher expectation of privacy.”). 
 187 Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 2012). 
 188 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 75, 110 (1994). 
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Any protection of a mobile device’s cloud-stored documents, 
however, would have to extend protection to documents or files stored on 
the phone itself.  It “would simply be an unworkable and unreasonable 
rule” to require the police to ascertain the nature of a mobile device 
before deciding to search its contents.189  Police in the field are charged 
with making split-second evidentiary decisions and cannot engage in an 
analysis of what type of device they are dealing with.190 
In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit cautioned: “Authorization to search some computer files therefore 
automatically becomes authorization to search all files in the same sub-
directory, and all files in an enveloping directory, a neighboring hard 
drive, a nearby computer or nearby storage media.”191  Thus, any rule 
governing mobile devices must, of necessity, encompass all mobile 
devices, including smart phones like the iPhone and the Android phone, 
or the “dumb” cell phone of the recent past.  Treating all mobile devices 
like a computer would more than fulfill the necessity for a clear rule.  
Once in an officer’s possession, the necessity for the search incident to 
arrest—the fear of evidence destruction before a warrant can be 
obtained192—disappears, and a “neutral and detached magistrate”193 can 
decide, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, whether the phone should be 
searched. 
This does not mean that the police must “avert their eyes” when 
presented with a phone upon which there may be an open and obvious 
text message indicating criminal activity.194  The “plain view” doctrine 
can be, and has been, applied to searches of computers.195  In United 
States v. Carey, police acting pursuant to a warrant to search for evidence 
 189 United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 190 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A police officer’s determination as 
to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad 
hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance 
into an analysis of each step in the search.”). 
 191 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 192 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. 
 193 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). 
 194 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489-90 (1971).  The “plain view” doctrine has 
never required the police to avoid using their senses; it has merely reinforced that police may not go 
on treasure hunts when faced with the prospect of juicy evidence. 
 195 United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521-22 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that warrant 
authorizing police to search suspect’s computer for evidence of harassment and making criminal 
threats “impliedly authorized” police to open every file on the computer, at least to determine 
“whether the file fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization,” meaning “any child 
pornography viewed on the computer or electronic media may be seized under the plain-view 
doctrine”); see also James Saylor, Note, Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine 
from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809 (2011). 
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of drug trafficking instead found child pornography on Carey’s 
computer.196  A police search of the “closed files,” the court held, was 
not constitutional because the closed files (though not the first open file 
that initiated the search) were not in plain view.197  If we must make 
analogies, then let us conclude that a smart phone is more like a 
computer than a pack of cigarettes.  A pack of cigarettes cannot contain 
the contents of a diary without sacrificing its size.  An iPhone, on the 
other hand, could contain the collected works of Shakespeare. 
CONCLUSION 
Convenient technologies are not flashes in the pan.  “Electronic 
storage and transmission of data is no longer a peculiarity or a luxury of 
the very rich; it’s a way of life.”198  Convenience breeds use, and with 
use, necessity.  The telegraph, telephone, email, and cell phone have all 
had their time as essential to individual lives and worldwide 
communications.  Increasingly, even voice communication on cell 
phones has taken a backseat to data transfers.199  The Cloud takes 
communication technology to the next level.  It enables us to take our 
“papers” with us wherever we go, but in a way that is nothing like a 
briefcase.  Quite literally, a person with a mobile device and cloud 
storage can access every document she or her has ever written and every 
photo she or he has ever taken, from anywhere in the world so long as 
there is an Internet connection.  The limitations of physical space no 
longer apply.  For example, I could save this Comment to Dropbox and 
edit it on my iPhone from a Maui beach if necessary.200  It appears, 
however, that a combination of uncertain jurisprudence and antiquated 
statutes have conspired to grant cloud-stored documents less protection 
than the Fourth Amendment demands. 
The SCA, though well intentioned, may pave the road to the demise 
of privacy as electronically stored and transmitted communication 
becomes ever more important.  The SCA needs to be amended, and well-
crafted legislation could solve the problems of ambiguity and the 
questionable 180-day requirement that the Sixth Circuit found 
unconstitutional.  Without a functioning SCA, however, there must be 
 196 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 197 Id. at 1273. 
 198 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 199 Jenna Wortham, Cellphones Now Used More for Data Than for Calls, N.Y. TIMES, May 
14, 2010, at B1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/technology/personaltech/14talk.html. 
 200 Sadly, the University would not provide travel expenses to permit me to prove that this 
was true. 
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some way to determine whether cloud-stored information is 
constitutionally protected.  And the Cloud is only one new technology 
that is changing how people live and work, while simultaneously 
creating headaches for law enforcement, which is forced to operate under 
rules based on eighteenth-century modes of living.  Technology that 
cannot even be conceived of yet will be subject to ossified regulation that 
addresses a very narrow, and currently arbitrary, aspect of the data: 
whether they were stored for more than 180 days. 
In the absence of legislation, the judiciary must intervene and 
determine that mobile devices, and the data stored upon them or 
accessible by them, are well outside the universe of “closed containers” 
contemplated by the Supreme Court of yesteryear.  Accordingly, a 
device’s contents, including its cloud-accessible documents, must be 
stored until a warrant is obtained.  Such an application would necessarily 
lead to a new understanding of technology’s interplay with the Fourth 
Amendment.  This understanding is crucial to the future of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, given how strained technology privacy 
jurisprudence has become under the weight of obsolete analogies that 
ignore new technology’s obvious, intrinsic qualities and instead classify 
it according to what James Madison was familiar with. 
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